landlock/

lib.rs

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT

//! Landlock is a security feature available since Linux 5.13.
//! The goal is to enable to restrict ambient rights
//! (e.g., global filesystem access)
//! for a set of processes by creating safe security sandboxes as new security layers
//! in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls.
//! This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs,
//! unexpected or malicious behaviors in applications.
//! Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
//! More information about Landlock can be found in the [official website](https://landlock.io).
//!
//! This crate provides a safe abstraction for the Landlock system calls, along with some helpers.
//!
//! Minimum Supported Rust Version (MSRV): 1.71
//!
//! # Use cases
//!
//! This crate is especially useful to protect users' data by sandboxing:
//! * trusted applications dealing with potentially malicious data
//!   (e.g., complex file format, network request) that could exploit security vulnerabilities;
//! * sandbox managers, container runtimes or shells launching untrusted applications.
//!
//! # Examples
//!
//! A simple example can be found with the [`path_beneath_rules()`] helper.
//! More complex examples can be found with the [`Ruleset` documentation](Ruleset)
//! and the [sandboxer example](https://github.com/landlock-lsm/rust-landlock/blob/master/examples/sandboxer.rs).
//!
//! # Current limitations
//!
//! This crate exposes the Landlock features available as of Linux 7.1
//! (Landlock [ABI v9](ABI::V9))
//! and then inherits some [kernel limitations](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/landlock.html#current-limitations)
//! that will be addressed with future kernel releases
//! (e.g., arbitrary mounts are always denied).
//!
//! # Compatibility
//!
//! Types defined in this crate are designed to enable the strictest Landlock configuration
//! for the given kernel on which the program runs.
//! In the default [best-effort](CompatLevel::BestEffort) mode,
//! [`Ruleset`] will determine compatibility
//! with the intersection of the currently running kernel's features
//! and those required by the caller.
//! This way, callers can distinguish between
//! Landlock compatibility issues inherent to the current system
//! (e.g., file names that don't exist)
//! and misconfiguration that should be fixed in the program
//! (e.g., empty or inconsistent access rights).
//! [`RulesetError`] identifies such kind of errors.
//!
//! With [`set_compatibility(CompatLevel::BestEffort)`](Compatible::set_compatibility),
//! users of the crate may mark Landlock features that are deemed required
//! and other features that may be downgraded to use lower security on systems
//! where they can't be enforced.
//! It is discouraged to compare the system's provided [Landlock ABI](ABI) version directly,
//! as it is difficult to track detailed ABI differences
//! which are handled thanks to the [`Compatible`] trait.
//!
//! To make it easier to migrate to a new version of this library,
//! we use the builder pattern
//! and designed objects to require the minimal set of method arguments.
//! Most `enum` are marked as `non_exhaustive` to enable backward-compatible evolutions.
//!
//! ## Test strategy
//!
//! Developers should test their sandboxed applications
//! with a kernel that supports all requested Landlock features
//! and check that [`RulesetCreated::restrict_self()`] returns a status matching
//! [`Ok(RestrictionStatus { ruleset: RulesetStatus::FullyEnforced, no_new_privs: true, })`](RestrictionStatus)
//! to make sure everything works as expected in an enforced sandbox.
//! Alternatively, using [`set_compatibility(CompatLevel::HardRequirement)`](Compatible::set_compatibility)
//! will immediately inform about unsupported Landlock features.
//! These configurations should only depend on the test environment
//! (e.g. [by checking an environment variable](https://github.com/landlock-lsm/rust-landlock/search?q=LANDLOCK_CRATE_TEST_ABI)).
//! However, applications should only check that no error is returned (i.e. `Ok(_)`)
//! and optionally log and inform users that the application is not fully sandboxed
//! because of missing features from the running kernel.
//!
//! ## Audit logging
//!
//! Landlock ABI v7 adds control over audit logging through boolean setters, especially
//! [`log_new_exec()`](RulesetCreatedAttr::log_new_exec)) which is useful (but noisy) for sandboxer
//! tools.
//!
//! ## Multithreaded processes
//!
//! By default `landlock_restrict_self()` only restricts the calling thread.
//! Landlock ABI v8 adds [`all_threads()`](RestrictSelfAttr::all_threads) to
//! atomically enforce the configuration on every thread of the process.  On
//! an older kernel this is silently dropped in the default best-effort mode,
//! leaving sibling and parent threads unrestricted, so multithreaded programs
//! that need this guarantee should require it (see
//! [`all_threads()`](RestrictSelfAttr::all_threads)).

#[cfg(test)]
#[macro_use]
extern crate lazy_static;

pub use access::{Access, HandledAccess};
pub use compat::{CompatLevel, Compatible, LandlockStatus, ABI};
pub use enumflags2::{make_bitflags, BitFlags};
pub use errata::Erratum;
pub use errors::{
    AccessError, AddRuleError, AddRulesError, CompatError, CreateRulesetError, Errno,
    HandleAccessError, HandleAccessesError, PathBeneathError, PathFdError, RestrictSelfError,
    RulesetError, ScopeError, SyscallFlagError,
};
pub use flags::{RestrictSelfFlag, SyscallFlag};
pub use fs::{path_beneath_rules, AccessFs, PathBeneath, PathFd};
pub use net::{AccessNet, NetPort};
pub use restrict_self::{RestrictSelf, RestrictSelfAttr, RestrictSelfStatus};
pub use ruleset::{
    RestrictionStatus, Rule, Ruleset, RulesetAttr, RulesetCreated, RulesetCreatedAttr,
    RulesetStatus,
};
pub use scope::Scope;

use access::PrivateHandledAccess;
use compat::{CompatResult, CompatState, Compatibility, TailoredCompatLevel, TryCompat};
use ruleset::PrivateRule;

#[cfg(test)]
use compat::{can_emulate, get_errno_from_landlock_status};
#[cfg(test)]
use errors::TestRulesetError;
#[cfg(test)]
use strum::IntoEnumIterator;

mod access;
mod compat;
mod errata;
mod errors;
mod flags;
mod fs;
mod net;
mod prctl;
mod restrict_self;
mod ruleset;
mod scope;
mod uapi;

// Makes sure private traits cannot be implemented outside of this crate.
mod private {
    pub trait Sealed {}

    impl Sealed for crate::AccessFs {}
    impl Sealed for crate::AccessNet {}
    impl Sealed for crate::Scope {}
    impl Sealed for crate::RestrictSelfFlag {}
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use crate::*;

    // These integration tests exercise the full builder-to-syscall path via
    // check_ruleset_support().  Other tests in compat.rs and errata.rs make
    // read-only kernel queries (LandlockStatus::current(), Erratum::current())
    // but do not create rulesets or restrict threads.  All remaining tests use
    // Ruleset::from(ABI) to exercise the builder logic and compatibility
    // engine without kernel interaction.

    // Emulate old kernel supports.  Iterates each ABI variant, mocks the
    // builder via B::from(abi), runs the closure on a dedicated thread, and
    // dispatches to the caller's assertion closures based on whether the
    // mocked ABI is emulatable on the running kernel.
    fn check_support<B, S, F, OkFn, ErrFn>(
        partial: ABI,
        full: Option<ABI>,
        check: F,
        assert_ok: OkFn,
        assert_err: ErrFn,
    ) where
        B: From<ABI> + Send + 'static,
        F: Fn(B) -> Result<S, TestRulesetError> + Send + Copy + 'static,
        S: std::fmt::Debug + Send + 'static,
        OkFn: Fn(ABI, Result<S, TestRulesetError>),
        ErrFn: Fn(Result<S, TestRulesetError>),
    {
        // If there is no partial support, it means that `full == partial`.
        assert!(partial <= full.unwrap_or(partial));
        for abi in ABI::iter() {
            // Ensures restrict_self() is called on a dedicated thread to avoid inconsistent tests.
            let ret = std::thread::spawn(move || check(B::from(abi)))
                .join()
                .unwrap();

            // Useful for failed tests and with cargo test -- --show-output
            println!("Checking ABI {abi:?}: received {ret:#?}");
            if can_emulate(abi, partial, full) {
                assert_ok(abi, ret);
            } else {
                assert_err(ret);
            }
        }
    }

    fn check_ruleset_support<F>(
        partial: ABI,
        full: Option<ABI>,
        check: F,
        error_if_abi_lt_partial: bool,
    ) where
        F: Fn(Ruleset) -> Result<RestrictionStatus, TestRulesetError> + Send + Copy + 'static,
    {
        check_support(
            partial,
            full,
            check,
            |abi, ret| {
                if abi < partial && error_if_abi_lt_partial {
                    // TODO: Check exact error type; this may require better error types.
                    assert!(matches!(ret, Err(TestRulesetError::Ruleset(_))));
                } else {
                    let full_support = if let Some(full_inner) = full {
                        abi >= full_inner
                    } else {
                        false
                    };
                    let ruleset_status = if full_support {
                        RulesetStatus::FullyEnforced
                    } else if abi >= partial {
                        RulesetStatus::PartiallyEnforced
                    } else {
                        RulesetStatus::NotEnforced
                    };
                    let landlock_status = abi.into();
                    println!("Expecting ruleset status {ruleset_status:?}");
                    println!("Expecting Landlock status {landlock_status:?}");
                    assert!(matches!(
                        ret,
                        Ok(RestrictionStatus {
                            ruleset,
                            landlock,
                            no_new_privs: true,
                            ..
                        }) if ruleset == ruleset_status && landlock == landlock_status
                    ))
                }
            },
            |ret| {
                // The errno value should be ENOSYS, EOPNOTSUPP, EINVAL (e.g. when an unknown
                // access right is provided), or E2BIG (e.g. when there is an unknown field in a
                // Landlock syscall attribute).
                let errno = get_errno_from_landlock_status();
                println!("Expecting error {errno:?}");
                match ret {
                    Err(
                        ref error @ TestRulesetError::Ruleset(RulesetError::CreateRuleset(
                            CreateRulesetError::CreateRulesetCall { ref source },
                        )),
                    ) => {
                        assert_eq!(source.raw_os_error(), Some(*Errno::from(error)));
                        match (source.raw_os_error(), errno) {
                            (Some(e1), Some(e2)) => assert_eq!(e1, e2),
                            (Some(e1), None) => assert!(matches!(e1, libc::EINVAL | libc::E2BIG)),
                            _ => unreachable!(),
                        }
                    }
                    // restrict_self flags may be rejected by the kernel with EINVAL
                    // when the mock ABI is higher than the running kernel's ABI.
                    Err(TestRulesetError::Ruleset(RulesetError::RestrictSelf(
                        RestrictSelfError::RestrictSelfCall { ref source },
                    ))) => {
                        assert_eq!(source.raw_os_error(), Some(libc::EINVAL));
                    }
                    _ => unreachable!(),
                }
            },
        );
    }

    // Emulate old kernel supports for the domain-less RestrictSelf builder.
    //
    // Unlike check_ruleset_support, RestrictSelf does not create a Landlock domain, so there is no
    // ruleset enforcement status to assert.  We verify the kernel probe (status.landlock) and
    // propagate any syscall error.  RestrictSelf::apply() enforces PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS by default.
    fn check_restrict_self_support<F>(partial: ABI, full: Option<ABI>, check: F)
    where
        F: Fn(RestrictSelf) -> Result<RestrictSelfStatus, TestRulesetError> + Send + Copy + 'static,
    {
        check_support(
            partial,
            full,
            check,
            |abi, ret| {
                let landlock_status: LandlockStatus = abi.into();
                println!("Expecting Landlock status {landlock_status:?}");
                assert!(matches!(
                    ret,
                    Ok(RestrictSelfStatus { landlock, .. }) if landlock == landlock_status
                ));
            },
            |ret| {
                // The errno value should be ENOSYS, EOPNOTSUPP, or EINVAL (e.g. when actual_flags
                // carries bits unknown to the running kernel).  Unlike check_ruleset_support,
                // landlock_restrict_self() is the first syscall here, so ENOSYS is possible when
                // Landlock is unavailable.
                let errno = get_errno_from_landlock_status();
                println!("Expecting error {errno:?}");
                match ret {
                    Err(
                        ref error @ TestRulesetError::Ruleset(RulesetError::RestrictSelf(
                            RestrictSelfError::RestrictSelfCall { ref source },
                        )),
                    ) => {
                        assert_eq!(source.raw_os_error(), Some(*Errno::from(error)));
                        match (source.raw_os_error(), errno) {
                            (Some(e1), Some(e2)) => assert_eq!(e1, e2),
                            (Some(e1), None) => assert!(matches!(e1, libc::EINVAL | libc::E2BIG)),
                            _ => unreachable!(),
                        }
                    }
                    _ => unreachable!(),
                }
            },
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn allow_root_compat() {
        let abi = ABI::V1;

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(abi))?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::from_all(abi)))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn too_much_access_rights_for_a_file() {
        let abi = ABI::V1;

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(abi))?
                    .create()?
                    // Same code as allow_root_compat() but with /etc/passwd instead of /
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(
                        PathFd::new("/etc/passwd")?,
                        // Only allow legitimate access rights on a file.
                        AccessFs::from_file(abi),
                    ))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            None,
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(abi))?
                    .create()?
                    // Same code as allow_root_compat() but with /etc/passwd instead of /
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(
                        PathFd::new("/etc/passwd")?,
                        // Tries to allow all access rights on a file.
                        AccessFs::from_all(abi),
                    ))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn path_beneath_rules_with_too_much_access_rights_for_a_file() {
        let abi = ABI::V1;

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(ABI::V1))?
                    .create()?
                    // Same code as too_much_access_rights_for_a_file() but using path_beneath_rules()
                    .add_rules(path_beneath_rules(["/etc/passwd"], AccessFs::from_all(abi)))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn allow_root_fragile() {
        let abi = ABI::V1;

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                // Sets default support requirement: abort the whole sandboxing for any Landlock error.
                Ok(ruleset
                    // Must have at least the execute check…
                    .set_compatibility(CompatLevel::HardRequirement)
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Execute)?
                    // …and possibly others.
                    .set_compatibility(CompatLevel::BestEffort)
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(abi))?
                    .create()?
                    .no_new_privs(true)
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::from_all(abi)))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            true,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ruleset_enforced() {
        let abi = ABI::V1;

        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    // Restricting without rule exceptions is legitimate to forbid a set of actions.
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Execute)?
                    .create()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v2_exec_refer() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V1,
            Some(ABI::V2),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Execute)?
                    // AccessFs::Refer is not supported by ABI::V1 (best-effort).
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Refer)?
                    .create()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v2_refer_only() {
        // When no access is handled, do not try to create a ruleset without access.
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V2,
            Some(ABI::V2),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Refer)?
                    .create()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v3_truncate() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V2,
            Some(ABI::V3),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Refer)?
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Truncate)?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::Refer))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ruleset_created_try_clone() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V1,
            Some(ABI::V1),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Execute)?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::Execute))?
                    .try_clone()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v4_tcp() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V3,
            Some(ABI::V4),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::Truncate)?
                    .handle_access(AccessNet::BindTcp | AccessNet::ConnectTcp)?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(NetPort::new(1, AccessNet::ConnectTcp))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v5_ioctl_dev() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V4,
            Some(ABI::V5),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessNet::BindTcp)?
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::IoctlDev)?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::IoctlDev))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v6_scope_mix() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V5,
            Some(ABI::V6),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::IoctlDev)?
                    .scope(Scope::AbstractUnixSocket | Scope::Signal)?
                    .create()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v6_scope_only() {
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V6,
            Some(ABI::V6),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .scope(Scope::AbstractUnixSocket | Scope::Signal)?
                    .create()?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v7_log_flags() {
        // Uses Scope::Signal to get partial enforcement at V6 (scopes supported
        // but log flags not).
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V6,
            Some(ABI::V7),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                let status = ruleset
                    .scope(Scope::Signal)?
                    .create()?
                    .log_same_exec(false)?
                    .log_new_exec(true)?
                    .log_subdomains(false)?
                    .restrict_self()?;

                if status.ruleset == RulesetStatus::FullyEnforced {
                    assert!(!status.log_same_exec);
                    assert!(status.log_new_exec);
                    assert!(!status.log_subdomains);
                } else {
                    assert!(status.log_same_exec);
                    assert!(!status.log_new_exec);
                    assert!(status.log_subdomains);
                }

                Ok(status)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ruleset_created_try_clone_ownedfd() {
        use std::os::unix::io::{AsRawFd, OwnedFd};

        let abi = ABI::V1;
        check_ruleset_support(
            abi,
            Some(abi),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                let ruleset1 = ruleset.handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(abi))?.create()?;
                let ruleset2 = ruleset1.try_clone().unwrap();
                let ruleset3 = ruleset2.try_clone().unwrap();

                let some1: Option<OwnedFd> = ruleset1.into();
                if let Some(fd1) = some1 {
                    assert!(fd1.as_raw_fd() >= 0);

                    let some2: Option<OwnedFd> = ruleset2.into();
                    let fd2 = some2.unwrap();
                    assert!(fd2.as_raw_fd() >= 0);

                    assert_ne!(fd1.as_raw_fd(), fd2.as_raw_fd());
                }
                Ok(ruleset3.restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn restrict_self_log_subdomains() {
        check_restrict_self_support(ABI::V7, Some(ABI::V7), move |rs: RestrictSelf| -> _ {
            Ok(rs.log_subdomains(false)?.apply()?)
        });
    }

    // ABI v8's LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC (exposed as all_threads()) applies
    // the domain to every thread of the process, not just the calling one.
    // Enforcing that in the cargo-test runner would restrict every test thread,
    // so each all_threads() setting runs in its own forked child (restrict_self
    // is irreversible and, with TSYNC, process-wide) that hosts exactly two
    // threads: its main thread and one sibling.  Both threads list "/" (which
    // needs AccessFs::ReadDir, handled by from_all(ABI::V1)) before and after
    // enforcement.
    //
    // Expected outcomes are pinned from TEST_ABI, the running kernel's Landlock
    // ABI: set per kernel by CI, auto-detected locally, and asserted to match
    // the kernel by current_kernel_abi().  It is an oracle independent of the
    // restrict_self() status under test: the calling thread must be denied iff
    // Landlock is enforced at all, and the sibling must be denied iff TSYNC is
    // both requested and supported (ABI v8+).  Both the kernel's real behavior
    // and the crate's reported status are checked against this truth, so a
    // silently dropped or otherwise ineffective TSYNC is caught on every kernel
    // in the CI matrix, from unsupported up to v8.
    #[test]
    fn abi_v8_all_threads() {
        use crate::compat::TEST_ABI;
        use std::sync::{Arc, Barrier};
        use std::thread;

        // Child exit code: OK, the OR of the mismatched checks, or PANICKED.
        const OK: i32 = 0;
        const MAIN_BEFORE_DENIED: i32 = 1 << 0;
        const SIBLING_BEFORE_DENIED: i32 = 1 << 1;
        const MAIN_AFTER_MISMATCH: i32 = 1 << 2;
        const SIBLING_AFTER_MISMATCH: i32 = 1 << 3;
        const STATUS_RULESET_MISMATCH: i32 = 1 << 4;
        const STATUS_TSYNC_MISMATCH: i32 = 1 << 5;
        const PANICKED: i32 = 1 << 6;

        // Listing "/" needs AccessFs::ReadDir: allowed before enforcement,
        // denied afterwards for every thread the domain covers.
        fn can_list_root() -> bool {
            std::fs::read_dir("/").is_ok()
        }

        // Ground truth for the running kernel, independent of the status object.
        let landlock_supported = *TEST_ABI != ABI::Unsupported;
        let tsync_supported = *TEST_ABI >= ABI::V8;

        for all_threads in [false, true] {
            // The sibling is covered only when TSYNC is requested and supported.
            let expect_sibling_denied = all_threads && tsync_supported;

            match unsafe { libc::fork() } {
                -1 => panic!("fork() failed: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error()),
                0 => {
                    // Any panic (builder error, spawn/join failure) becomes a
                    // non-zero code rather than being swallowed as a pass.
                    let code = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| {
                        let barrier = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
                        let sibling = {
                            let barrier = Arc::clone(&barrier);
                            thread::spawn(move || {
                                let before = can_list_root();
                                // Both threads probed before enforcing.
                                barrier.wait();
                                // Main has called restrict_self().
                                barrier.wait();
                                (before, can_list_root())
                            })
                        };

                        let main_before = can_list_root();
                        barrier.wait();

                        let status = Ruleset::default()
                            .handle_access(AccessFs::from_all(ABI::V1))
                            .unwrap()
                            .create()
                            .unwrap()
                            .all_threads(all_threads)
                            .unwrap()
                            .restrict_self()
                            .unwrap();
                        barrier.wait();

                        let main_denied = !can_list_root();
                        let (sibling_before, sibling_after) = sibling.join().unwrap();
                        let sibling_denied = !sibling_after;
                        let ruleset_enforced = status.ruleset != RulesetStatus::NotEnforced;

                        let mut code = OK;
                        // Both threads can list "/" before enforcement.
                        if !main_before {
                            code |= MAIN_BEFORE_DENIED;
                        }
                        if !sibling_before {
                            code |= SIBLING_BEFORE_DENIED;
                        }
                        // Kernel reality matches the independent expectation.
                        if main_denied != landlock_supported {
                            code |= MAIN_AFTER_MISMATCH;
                        }
                        if sibling_denied != expect_sibling_denied {
                            code |= SIBLING_AFTER_MISMATCH;
                        }
                        // The crate's reported status matches it too.
                        if ruleset_enforced != landlock_supported {
                            code |= STATUS_RULESET_MISMATCH;
                        }
                        if status.all_threads != expect_sibling_denied {
                            code |= STATUS_TSYNC_MISMATCH;
                        }
                        code
                    })
                    .unwrap_or(PANICKED);
                    // _exit avoids atexit handlers and destructors inherited from
                    // the test harness.
                    unsafe { libc::_exit(code) };
                }
                pid => {
                    let mut wstatus: libc::c_int = 0;
                    let ret = unsafe { libc::waitpid(pid, &mut wstatus, 0) };
                    assert_eq!(ret, pid);
                    assert!(libc::WIFEXITED(wstatus));
                    assert_eq!(libc::WEXITSTATUS(wstatus), OK, "all_threads({all_threads})");
                }
            }
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn abi_v9_resolve_unix() {
        // ResolveUnix is the only access right added in ABI v9, and ABI v8 added
        // no filesystem access right, so there is no access from a lower ABI to
        // combine it with while keeping `partial` and `full` adjacent.  It is
        // therefore tested on its own with partial == full == V9, like
        // abi_v2_refer_only.  Pairing it with a non-adjacent lower right (e.g.
        // IoctlDev from V5) would leave mocked ABIs V6..=V8 where only that lower
        // right is enforced (PartiallyEnforced); can_emulate() expects an error
        // whenever the runner kernel's ABI is below the mocked one, so such a
        // test would pass or fail depending on the runner kernel.
        //
        // For a mocked ABI below V9, ResolveUnix is dropped by best-effort
        // compatibility: no access is handled, create() builds no kernel ruleset
        // and add_rule() is a no-op, so restrict_self() reports NotEnforced (not
        // an error).  At mocked ABI V9 the ruleset is fully enforced on a v9
        // kernel, or the create()/add_rule() syscall is rejected on an older one
        // (asserted through can_emulate()'s error path).
        check_ruleset_support(
            ABI::V9,
            Some(ABI::V9),
            move |ruleset: Ruleset| -> _ {
                Ok(ruleset
                    .handle_access(AccessFs::ResolveUnix)?
                    .create()?
                    .add_rule(PathBeneath::new(PathFd::new("/")?, AccessFs::ResolveUnix))?
                    .restrict_self()?)
            },
            false,
        );
    }
}